Mir-BFT: High-Throughput BFT for Blockchains by Stathakopoulou, Chrysoula et al.
Mir-BFT: High-Throughput BFT for Blockchains
Chrysoula Stathakopoulou
IBM Research - Zurich
Tudor David
IBM Research - Zurich
Marko Vukolic´
IBM Research - Zurich
Abstract
This paper presents Mir-BFT (or, simply, Mir), a robust
asynchronous Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) total order
broadcast protocol aimed at maximizing throughput on
wide-area networks (WANs) with up to 100 nodes. This
deployment setting is highly relevant to many permis-
sioned and Proof-of-Stake permissionless blockchains.
Mir achieves unprecedented throughput on WANs
without sacrificing latency, robustness to malicious be-
havior, or even performance in clusters. To achieve this,
Mir is the first BFT protocol that allows a set of lead-
ers to propose request batches independently, in paral-
lel, while preventing request duplication performance at-
tacks through a rotating assignment of a partitioned re-
quest hash space to leaders. We also propose several op-
timizations to Mir that boost the throughput even further,
including partial replication through a novel abstraction
we call light total order (LTO) broadcast.
Perhaps most importantly, Mir relies on proven BFT
protocol constructs, which is fundamental to Mir prov-
ability and correctness. Specifically, Mir is a general-
ization of the celebrated and scrutinized PBFT protocol.
While Mir follows PBFT “safety-wise”, it introduces sub-
stantial changes with respect to PBFT liveness (i.e., leader
election), which help it become the highest throughput
BFT protocol on WANs with up to 100 nodes to date,
reaching more than 23000 Bitcoin-sized tps.
1 Introduction
Blockchains are decentralized, globally-distributed,
strongly consistent replicated systems that run across
networks of mutually untrusting nodes. Since the in-
ception of Bitcoin’s decentralized cash application [43],
modern blockchain systems have evolved the ability to
run arbitrary distributed applications (e.g., [4, 13]), with
the promise of supporting entire decentralized economies
[1] and business ecosystems across industries [6].
Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) protocols, which tol-
erate arbitrary (Byzantine [37]) behavior of a subset of
nodes, have evolved to be the key technology to power
blockchains and ensure their consistency [48, 25]. BFT
protocols relevant to blockchain are consensus and state
machine replication (SMR) protocols (e.g., [22]) or, even
more specifically, total order (TO) broadcast protocols
that establish the basis for SMR [44]. Such BFT protocols
have found their use in replacing (or, less often, comple-
menting) energy-wasting and slow Proof-of-Work (PoW)
consensus protocols used to power early blockchains in-
cluding Bitcoin, which process between 7 and 60 transac-
tions per second [48, 29].
In general, current BFT protocols do not scale well with
the number of nodes (replicas) and hence do not perform
to the needs of blockchain use cases. State-of-the-art BFT
protocols are either very efficient on small scales in clus-
ters (e.g., [15, 34]) or exhibit modest performance on large
scales (thousands or more nodes) across wide area net-
works (WAN) (e.g., [30]).
However, the sweet spot of design goals, which com-
bines medium-size networks (e.g., up to 100 nodes) and
excellent performance across WANs, remains largely un-
explored. This design spot is highly relevant to different
types of blockchain networks. On the one hand, permis-
sioned blockchains, such as Hyperledger Fabric [13]), are
rarely deployed on scales above 100 nodes, yet use cases
gathering dozens of organizations (e.g,. banks) are very
prominent [3]. In such use cases, every organization rep-
resents a separate administrative domain, which defines
boundaries of trust, and the requirement that each orga-
nization runs (or administers) at least one node is very
common. On the other hand, this design spot is also
highly relevant in the context of large scale permission-
less blockchains, in which anyone can participate, that
use weighted voting (based e.g., on Proof-of-Stake (PoS)
[20, 32], delegated PoS (DPoS) [7]), or committee-voting
[30, 33], to limit the number of nodes involved in the crit-
ical path of the consensus protocol. With such weighted
voting, the number of (relevant) nodes for PoS/DPoS con-
sensus is typically in the order of a hundred ([7]) or some-
times even less (e.g., few dozens of nodes [10]).
This paper fills in the void and presents Mir-BFT (or,
simply, Mir), a novel total order (TO) BFT protocol that
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achieves the best throughput to date on public WAN net-
works with up to 100 nodes. Mir achieves this with-
out compromising robustness to failures and malicious at-
tacks, latency, performance on small scale and in clusters,
or correctness/provability. The following summarizes the
main features of Mir, as well as contributions of this pa-
per:
• Mir builds on the seminal leader-based PBFT proto-
col [22] by generalizing its “liveness” part. In short,
Mir allows multiple concurrent leaders to propose
batches of requests in parallel. In doing so, Mir
leverages multiple secure connections (gRPC) across
each pair of nodes, as opposed to state-of-the-art de-
signs that use a single TCP/TLS connection between
a pair of nodes. This proves to be critical in over-
coming apparent cross-site bandwidth limitations of-
ten reported in geo-replicated systems research (e.g.,
[45, 38]). Here, Mir relies natively on PBFT original
UDP-oriented logic to deal with potential re-ordering
that stems from using multiple connections.
• On the protocol level, the seemingly simple idea
of using multiple leaders in parallel raises the issue
of request duplication performance attacks which
plague related approaches (e.g., [41, 24, 35]). With
up to n leaders, such attacks may induce an n-fold
duplication of every single request and bring the ef-
fective throughput to its knees, voiding the bene-
fits of using multiple leaders. To prevent request
duplication attacks, Mir partitions the request hash
space across replicas. In addition, due to potential re-
quest censorship of malicious leaders, Mir rotates a
partitioning assigment across protocol configrations
(epochs). This approach is novel in the context of
BFT protocols.
• While the base version of Mir implements classi-
cal TO broadcast and disseminates every request to
every correct node, this guarantee is uneccessarily
strong for some blockchains. To this end, we intro-
duce the concept of a light total order (LTO) broad-
cast, which is identical to TO, except that it pro-
vides partial data availability guaranteeing the de-
livery of every request to at least one correct node.
Other correct nodes get and agree on the order of
cryptographic hashes of requests, which is the basis
for maintaining other TO properties. Such guaran-
tees are highly relevant to blockchain systems that
separate the execution of applications (smart con-
tracts) from the agreement on the order of transac-
tions [50, 13]. Mir further uses client signature veri-
fication sharding optimization to offload CPU, which
often becomes a bottleneck in Mir.
• Perhaps most importantly, and as intuited above,
Mir relies on proven BFT protocol constructs which
is fundamental to Mir provability and correctness,
avoiding “design-from-scratch”, which is known to
be error-prone [15]. Specifically, Mir as described in
this paper is a generalization of the celebrated and
scrutinized PBFT protocol (Mir variants based on
other BFT protocols can be derived as well). While
Mir follows PBFT “safety-wise”, it introduces sub-
stantial changes with respect to PBFT liveness (e.g.,
leader election), which we sketched above and de-
scribe in more detail in the rest of the paper. Restrict-
ing changes to PBFT liveness, dramatically simpli-
fies the reasoning about the correctness of Mir.
• Finally, we implement Mir in Go and run it with up
to 100 nodes in a WAN, as well as in clusters and
under faults, comparing it to state of the art BFT pro-
tocols. We also evaluate the impact of multiple op-
timizations we propose. Our results show that Mir
delivers more than 23k Bitcoin-sized tps on a scale
of 100 nodes on a WAN, dramatically outperforming
state of the art. On smaller scales with 4 to 49 nodes,
Mir delivers 42k-53k tps, with typical latencies of 1-
2 sec.
To put this into perspective, Mir’s 23000 tps on 100
nodes on WAN are enough to multiplex advertised peak
throughputs of the top 20 blockchain networks per market
cap (less than 20k tps in total [8] for more than $220B
USD total market capitalization). It is roughly equal to the
alleged peak capacity of VISA (24k tps [8]) and more than
11x faster than the actual average VISA transaction rate
(about 2k tps [48]). We expect that such a performance
will open the door for new blockchain use cases.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2, we give preliminary definitions and briefly present
PBFT (for completeness). In Section 3, we give an
overview of Mir and changes it introduces to PBFT. We
then explain Mir implementation details in Section 4. We
present Mir optimizations, including LTO, in Section 5.
This is followed by Mir correctness arguments in Sec-
tion 6. Section 7 gives evaluation details. Finally, Sec-
tion 8 discusses related work.
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Figure 1: PBFT communication pattern and messages. Bottleneck messages are shown in bold.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 System Model
We assume an asynchronous (eventually synchronous)
network [26] of n nodes (the set of all nodes is denoted
by Nodes), in which the communication among correct
nodes is synchronous after some time GST , unknown to
nodes. We assume a public key infrastructure in which
nodes and clients are identified by their public keys; we
further assume node identities are lexicographically or-
dered and mapped by a bijection to the set [0 . . . n − 1]
which we use to reason about node identities. We assume
that, at any point in time, at most f nodes can simultane-
ously be Byzantine faulty (i.e., crash or deviate from the
protocol in an arbitrary way), such that n ≥ 3f + 1. Any
number of clients can be Byzantine faulty.
We assume an adversary that can control Byzantine
faulty nodes but cannot break the cryptographic primitives
we use, such as PKI and cryptographic hashes. H(data)
denotes a cryptographic hash of data, while dataσp de-
notes data signed by process p (client or node).
Nodes implement a BFT total order (atomic) broad-
cast service to a set of Clients (some clients can be col-
located with nodes). To broadcast request r, a client
invokes BCAST(r), with nodes eventually outputting
DELIVER(sn, r), such that the following properties hold:
P1 Validity: If a correct node delivers r then some client
broadcasted r.
P2 Agreement: If two correct nodes deliver requests r
and r′ with sequence number sn, then r = r′.
P3 No duplication: If a correct node delivers request r
with sequence numbers sn and sn′, then sn = sn′.
P4 Liveness: If a correct client broadcasts request r,
then every correct node eventually delivers r.
Processes communicate through authenticated point-to-
point channels. Our implementation uses gRPC [5]; be-
tween each pair of nodes there can be multiple gRPC con-
nections/streams. If two processes cannot communicate in
a timely manner, we talk about asynchrony. Asynchrony
can divide nodes into network partitions.
2.2 Crash Course on PBFT
We depict the PBFT communication pattern in Figure 1.
PBFT proceeds in rounds called views which are led
by the primary. The primary sequences and replicates
client’s request in a PRE-PREPARE message — on
WANs this step is a (network) bottleneck. Upon recep-
tion of the PRE-PREPARE, other nodes validate the re-
quest, which involves, at least, verifying the authentic-
ity of a client’s request (we say a node pre-prepares the
request). This is followed by two rounds of all-to-all
communication (PREPARE and COMMIT messages),
which are not bottlenecks as they leverage n links in par-
allel and contain metadata (request hash) only. A node
prepares a request and sends a COMMIT message if it
gets a PREPARE message from a quorum (2f+1 nodes)
that matches a PRE-PREPARE. Finally, nodes commit
the request in total order, if they get a quorum of match-
ing COMMIT messages.
In PBFT, the primary is changed only if it is faulty
or there are network partitions breaking the availability
of a quorum. In this case, nodes timeout and initiate
a view-change. View-change involves a communication
among nodes in which the information about the latest
pre-prepared and prepared requests is exchanged, such
that the new primary, which is selected in round robin
fashion, must re-propose a potentially committed request
under the same sequence number within a NEW-VIEW
message (please see [22] for details). The PBFT view-
change pattern can be simplified using signatures [21].
After the primary is changed, the system enters the new
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Protocol PBFT [22] Mir
Round structure/naming views epochs
Round-change responsibility view primary (round-robin across all nodes) epoch primary (round-robin across all nodes)
No. of per-round leaders 1 (view primary) many (from 1 to n epoch leaders)
Round leader selection primary is the only leader primary decides on epoch leaders (subject to constraints)
Request duplication prevention enforced by the primary hash space partitioning across epoch leaders (rotating)
Batching no (or, 1 request per “batch”) yes
Multiple-batches in parallel yes (watermarks) yes (watermarks)
No. of batches per round unbounded bounded (unless epoch is stable)
Use of signatures no client requests, epoch change and checkpoint messages
Internode transport UDP multiple gRPC connections between every pair of nodes
Table 1: High level overview of the original PBFT [22] vs. Mir protocol structure.
view and common-case operation resumes. PBFT com-
plements this main common-case/view-change protocols
with checkpointing (log and state compaction) and state
transfer subprotocols [22].
3 Mir Overview
Mir is based on PBFT [22] (Sec. 2.2) — major differences
are summarized in Table 1. In this section we elaborate on
these differences, giving a high-level overview of Mir.
Authentication. While PBFT is signature-free, Mir
uses signatures for authentication in three places. First,
Mir authenticates clients’ REQUEST messages with sig-
natures, as most blockchains do for clients’ requests, and
to avoid concerns associated with “big-MAC” attacks re-
lated to the MAC authenticators PBFT uses [23]. Second,
Mir uses signatures to authenticate EPOCH-CHANGE mes-
sages which are sent only to the new primary, to simplify
the implementation (avoiding PBFT VIEW-CHANGE-ACK
messages, all-to-all VIEW-CHANGE messages and associ-
ated bookkeeping). Finally, Mir signs CHECKPOINT mes-
sages to simplify recovery.
Batching. Mir processes requests in batches, a standard
throughput improvement of PBFT (see e.g., [34, 15]).
Protocol round structure. Mir proceeds in epochs
which are the counterpart to views in PBFT. Just like
PBFT views, each epoch has a primary which is deter-
ministically defined by the epoch number, by round-robin
rotation across all the participating nodes of the protocol.
Each epoch has a set of leaders (in contrast, in PBFT
only the primary is the leader). EpLeaders(e) denotes
epoch leaders, nodes responsible for assigning a batch to a
unique sequence number sn within an epoch e. In failure-
free operation, Mir proceeds analogously to the normal
case operation of PBFT, except that the sequence numbers
are partitioned uniformly among the epoch leaders and all
leaders can propose their batches simultaneously.
In epoch e, at most maxSn(e) batches can be ordered.
In a recovery epoch e, maxSn(e) is bounded (an inte-
ger). If a recovery epoch ends graciously, i.e., nodes de-
liver this maximum number of batches, Mir transitions to
the next epoch via a lightweight gracious epoch-change
protocol. In a stable epoch e, maxSn(e) = ∞ and Mir
moves to the next epoch only in case of failures or net-
work partitions (ungracious epoch-change). In contrast,
every PBFT view can be seen as “stable” and every view-
change as ungracious.
Epoch e is stable if and only if the number of epoch
leaders is greater or equal to the configuration parameter
StableLeaders. In this paper, we set StableLeaders =
n (i.e., a stable epoch has all nodes as leaders), and con-
figure Mir to have a stable first epoch 0.
Selecting epoch leaders. In this paper, we use a simple
approach to selecting epoch leaders. Namely, the epoch
e primary chooses the set of epoch leaders subject to the
following constraints, which depend on the outcome of
the preceding epoch e′: 1) if e′ ends graciously, the leader
set cannot reduce in size and it grows if the primary be-
lieves that more than |EpLeaders(e′)| nodes are correct,
2) if e′ ends ungraciously, the leader set cannot grow and
if |EpLeaders(e′)| > 1 it must reduce in size, and 3) the
primary is always in the leader set.
In general, more elaborate leader set choices, which
are outside the scope of this paper, can consider a func-
tion EpLeaders(e, ctx), where ctx a context based on
heuristics such as execution history, weighted voting, dis-
tributed randomness, or stake. The context can be deter-
mined locally at each node in a non-interactive way, can
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be announced by the primary or can be established among
all nodes after a round of interaction. The only prop-
erty we require is that any two correct nodes that evaluate
EpLeaders(e, ctx) get the same set of nodes, determin-
istically, for the same epoch number e.
The challenge of request duplication attacks. Moving
from the single leader PBFT to the multi-leader Mir poses
the challenge of partitioning requests among epoch lead-
ers. A simplistic approach would be to allow any leader to
add any request into a batch, either in the common case,
or in the case of client request retransmission (as in e.g.,
[41, 24, 35]). This approach, combined with a client send-
ing a request to exactly one node, allows no duplication
with good throughput only in the best case, i.e., with no
malicious clients/leaders and with no asynchrony.
However, this approach is not robust [23] outside the
best case, in particular with malicious clients sending re-
quests to multiple nodes, performing the request dupli-
cation performance attack. Moreover, a client cannot be
naively declared as malicious and blacklisted if it sends
a request to multiple nodes. Indeed, as malicious leaders
can drop requests selectively (we talk about censoring re-
quests), a client needs to send the request to at least f +1
nodes (i.e., to O(n) nodes) in the worst case.1 Therefore,
a simplistic approach to parallel request processing with
multiple leaders [41, 24, 35] faces attacks that can reduce
throughput by factor of O(n), nullifying the effects of us-
ing multiple leaders.
Buckets and request hash space partitioning. Mir
partitions the hash space into m ∗ n non-interesecting
buckets of (approximately) equal size, where m is a con-
figuration parameter. Each leader of epoch e is assigned at
least b m∗n|EpLeaders(e)|c buckets; in case of remaining buck-
ets, the primary and subsequent epoch leaders per lexico-
graphic order, are assigned 1 additional bucket each.
Rotating bucket assignment. In case of a recovery
epoch e, the bucket assignment to leaders is fixed through-
out e. In case of a stable epoch e, bucket assignment ro-
tates. We denote by ActiveBucket(i, sn, e) the set of
buckets that leader i within epoch e is assigned for se-
quence number sn (the parameter sn is relevant here only
if e is stable). Figure 2 illustrates the mapping of requests
to buckets in a stable epoch with n = 4 (m = 1).
A leader proposes only the requests which are mapped
to their active buckets. As we describe in detail later,
1Incentives, e.g., transaction fees [43, 49], could help with request
censoring in case of a rational adversary [11], potentially simplifying
Mir. Here, we focus on the more challenging (“irrational”) adversary.
Figure 2: Request mapping in a stable epoch with n = 4:
Incoming arrows represent the request arrivals. Outgo-
ing arrows represent requests being added to batches.
Solid lines represent the active buckets. Hash(Req. 1)
is mapped to the first bucket, active in node 0. Hash(Req.
2) is mapped to the third bucket, active in node 2.
the assignment of buckets to EpLeaders is periodically
rotating within a stable epoch (Sec. 4.3) and across
recovery epochs (Sec. 4.4.1), guaranteeing liveness.
Parallelism. Mir implementation (detailed in Sec. 4.8)
is highly parallelized, with every worker thread respon-
sible for one batch (consensus instance). In addition,
Mir uses multiple gRPC connections among each pair of
nodes which proves to be critical in boosting throughput
in a WAN especially with a small number of nodes.
Generalization of PBFT and emulation of other proto-
cols. Mir reduces to PBFT by setting StableLeaders =
1. This makes every epoch stable, hides bucket ro-
tation (primary is the single leader) and makes every
epoch change ungracious. Mir can approximate proto-
cols such as Tendermint [19] and Spinning [47] by set-
ting StableLeaders > 1, and fixing maxSn(e) = 1
and |EpLeaders(e)| = 1 in every epoch e, making ev-
ery epoch a recovery epoch and rotating leader/primary
with every batch.
4 Mir Implementation Details
4.1 The Client
Upon BCAST(o), broadcasting operation o, client c cre-
ates a message 〈REQUEST, o, t, c〉σc . The message in-
cludes the client’s timestamp t, a monotonically increas-
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ing sequence number, that must be in a sliding window be-
tween the low and high client watermark tcL < t ≤ tcH .
Client watermarks in Mir allow multiple requests origi-
nating from the same client to be“in-flight”, while allow-
ing them to be processed by different leaders in parallel.
The low and high watermarks of the client’s timestamp
sliding window are periodically advanced with the check-
point mechanism described in Section 4.5.
In this section, we assume that the client sends
〈REQUEST, o, t, c〉σc to all nodes. We however im-
plemented a lightweight discovery mechanism (see Sec-
tion 5.3) that allows clients to submit requests to a single
node.
4.2 Common-case operation
Within an epoch e, the leadership in proposing batches is
partitioned across epoch leaders. Epoch primary proposes
the first batch in the epoch; after that, the leaders take
turn in leading batches in a deterministic, lexicographic
order. We say that a leader leads batch Bsn when the
leader is assigned broadcasting a PRE-PREPARE for the
batch with sequence number sn. Batches are proposed
in parallel by all epoch leaders and are processed like in
PBFT. Recall that batch watermarking allows the PBFT
primary to propose multiple batches in parallel; in Mir,
we simply extend this to multiple leaders (see Fig. 3).
Figure 3: PRE-PREPARE sending in Mir stable epoch:
All nodes are epoch leaders, balancing the proposal load.
In epoch 0, we assign buckets to leaders sequentially,
starting from the buckets with the lowest hash values
which we assign to primary 0, and so on. When e > 0,
the primary picks its buckets and selects a consecutive se-
quence of buckets starting from the bucket which contains
the oldest request it received; this is key to ensuring Live-
ness (P4, Sec. 2.1). The other leaders are then determinis-
tically and sequentially assigned the following buckets.
With such an assignment, the protocol proceeds as
follows. Upon receiving 〈REQUEST, o, t, c〉σc from a
client, an epoch leader first verifies that the request times-
tamp is in the client’s current window tCL < t ≤ tCH
and maps the request to a respective bucket by hashing
the request payload along with the client timestamp and
identifier hr = H(o||t||c). If the request falls into the
leader’s active bucket, the leader also verifies the client’s
signature on REQUEST. Malformed signatures result in
a node locally blacklisting the client for a predefined pe-
riod of time.
The request is discarded if the hr is already in the logs
of the node, either because it has already been preprepared
or because it is already pending in a bucket.
Each bucket is implemented as a FIFO queue. Once
enough requests are gathered in the current active bucket
of the leader, or if timer Tbatch expires (since the last batch
was proposed by i), leader i adds the requests from the
current active bucket in a batch, assigns to the batch its
next available sequence number sn (provided sn is within
batch watermarks) and sends a PRE-PREPARE mes-
sage. If Tbatch time has elapsed and no requests are avail-
able, leader i broadcasts a special PRE-PREPARE mes-
sage with an empty batch. This guarantees the progress of
the protocol with low load.
Each node j accepts a PRE-PREPARE (we say
preprepares the batch and the requests it contains), with
sequence number sn for epoch e from leader i provided
that: (1) the epoch number matches the local epoch num-
ber and j did not preprepare another batch with the same
e and sn, (2) node i is in theEpLeaders(e) set, (3) leader
i leads sn, (4) the sequence number sn of the batch in the
PRE-PREPARE is between a low watermark and high
watermark: w < sn ≤ W , (5) every request in the
batch has a timestamp within the current client’s water-
marks, (6) none of the requests in the batch have already
been preprepared, (7) each request in the batch is assigned
to ActiveBucket(i, sn, e), and (8) every request in the
batch was submitted by a client authorized to write and
the request signature is valid.
Condition (8) effectively enforces access control,
which helps protect against flooding denial-of-service
(DoS) and helps ensure Validity (Property P1, Sec. 2.1).
As this step may reveal to be a bottleneck in Mir if per-
formed by all nodes (e.g., in a case where all nodes need
to perform a relatively expensive cryptographic task such
as signature verification per transaction), we use signature
sharding as an optimization (see Sec. 5.2).
If validation succeeds, node j then sends a PREPARE
and the protocol proceeds exactly as PBFT. Upon commit-
ting a batch with sequence number k from leader i, node
j removes from its buckets any request that is already in
batch k.
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4.3 Active bucket rotation in a stable epoch
Mir introduces a bucket rotation mechanism to prevent re-
quest censoring, as we motivated in Section 3.
Bucket rotation in stable epoch relies on leader-to-
leader bucket handover, which works as follows. Every
BR(e) batches (a configuration parameter), leaders rotate
the assignment of buckets, such that leader i gets assigned
buckets previously led by leader i+1 (in modulo n arith-
metics). To prevent request duplication, leader i waits to
commit locally all batches pertaining to buckets i gets as-
signed to (in particular those lead by i + 1), before start-
ing proposing own batches. Other nodes also do the same
before they pre-prepare batches in these buckets that are
proposed by i.
Referring to the example shown in Figure 2, with n = 4
and 4 buckets in total, after BR(e) batches, node 0 gets
assigned the red bucket (which was assigned to node 1),
yet node 0 starts proposing batches only after it locally
commits all batches pertaining to the red bucket that were
previously committed — informally, node 1 hands over
the red bucket to node 0.
4.4 Epoch-change
Mir distinguishes two variants of epoch-change, gracious
and ungracious epoch change.
4.4.1 Gracious epoch-change
Gracious epoch change occurs at the gracious end of a
recovery epoch. Its goal is to implement a lightweight
mechanism for potentially growing the set of leaders to-
wards a stable epoch, and to implement a variant of the
bucket rotation to ensure Liveness across recovery epochs.
After the primary of recovery epoch e + 1
(EpPrimary(e + 1)) delivers maxSn(e) batches
in recovery epoch e (or, as an optimization, shortly
before), EpPrimary(e + 1) reliably broadcast the
configuration of epoch e + 1. To this end, we use the
classical 3-phase Bracha reliable broadcast [18].
The epoch configuration information, which the pri-
mary reliably broadcasts, contains: 1) the set of epoch
leaders for the new epoch, 2) identifiers of buckets that
the primary picked for itself, derived from the oldest re-
quests pending at the primary. Recall that, if e ends gra-
ciously, the leader set cannot reduce in size and it grows
if the primary of epoch e + 1 believes that more than
|EpLeaders(e)| nodes are correct. In this case, the pri-
mary propose max(n,EpLeaders(e)+1) nodes, chosen
by the primary.2 In case the primary of epoch e + 1 esti-
mates that no more than |EpLeaders(e)| nodes are cor-
rect, it is allowed to maintain the same set of leaders as
in the previous epoch — this avoids frequent oscillations
between gracious and ungracious epoch changes, e.g.,in
case few nodes are crash-faulty.
Finally, similar to bucket handover (Sec. 4.3), leader
i in epoch e + 1 starts proposing batches, as soon as it
delivers all batches from e from nodes that were assigned
the buckets now assigned to i.
4.4.2 Ungracious epoch-change
Ungracious epoch-changes in Mir are caused by epoch
timeouts due to asynchrony or failures and generalize
PBFT view-changes. Similar to PBFT, after deliver-
ing batch sn in epoch e, a node resets and triggers an
epoch-change timer ecT imer. If an ecT imer expires, a
node enters the epoch-change subprotocol to move from
epoch e to epoch e + 1. In this case, a node sends
an EPOCH-CHANGE message to EpPrimary(e+ 1).
EPOCH-CHANGE message follows the structure of
PBFT VIEW-CHANGE message (page 411, [22]) with
the difference that it is signed and that there are no VIEW-
CHANGE-ACK messages exchanged (for simplicity of
implementation). The construction of the NEW-EPOCH
message then proceeds in the same way as the PBFT con-
struction of the NEW-VIEW message.
Before triggeringthe PBFT-inherited processing of
NEW-EPOCH message, nodes wait to reliably deliver
configuration information pertaining to the new epoch,
which the primary reliably broadcasts,v just like in gra-
cious epoch change (Sec. 4.4.1). The difference is that in
an ungracious epoch change the epoch primary must se-
lect a smaller number of epoch leaders than in the previ-
ous epoch. Concretely, in the configuration for new epoch
e, lthe epoch primary picks the number of leaders in the
last epoch e′ for which it has the configuration, and pro-
poses at most max(1, |EpLeaders(e′)− e+ e′| leaders.
Note that the epoch primary must always be in the epoch
leader set.
Finally, to counter the possibility of losing requests due
to an epoch change, a node resurrects potentially pre-
prepared but uncommitted requests from previous views
that are not reflected in the NEW-EPOCH message. In-
deed, when an epoch change occurs, not all batches that
were created and potentially preprepared before this event
are delivered when installing the new epoch. To pre-
vent the requests in these batches from being lost (due
2Although in this paper we use sequential increments and decrements
of size of the leader set — the leader set can grow and shrink according
to different policies.
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to condition (6) in pre-preparing a batch — Sec. 4.2), be-
fore resuming normal operation after an ungracious epoch
change, each correct node ensures that (1) the requests in
such batches are returned to node’s pending bucket, and
(2) these requests are removed from the logs of the node
where they were marked as preprepared. Thus, these re-
quests are ready to be proposed again. Together with
the requirement that clients ensure that a correct replica
eventually receives their request, this guarantees Liveness
(P4), i.e., that client requests are eventually delivered,
even in the face of view changes.
4.5 Checkpointing (Garbage Collection)
Similarly to PBFT, Mir uses a checkpoint mechanism
to prune the message logs. After each node i has
delivered a batch with sequence number snC divisi-
ble by configuration parameter C (which means that
all batches with sequence numbers lower than snC
have been locally committed at i) node i broadcasts a
〈CHECKPOINT, snC , H(sn′C)〉σi, where sn′C the last
checkpoint and H(sn′C) is the hash digest of the batches
with sequence numbers sn in range sn′C ≤ sn < snC .
Each node collects checkpoint messages until it has 2f +
1, including its own, and persist a checkpoint certificate.
At this point, the checkpoint is stable and the node can
discard the common-case messages from its log for se-
quence numbers lower than sn.
Mir advances batch watermarks at checkpoints like
PBFT does. Clients’ watermarks are also possibly ad-
vanced at checkpoints, as the state related to previously
delivered requests is discarded. For each client c, the low
watermark tcL advances to the highest timestamp t in a
request submitted by c that has been delivered, such that
all requests with timestamp t′ < t have also been deliv-
ered. The high watermark advances to tcH = wc + tcL ,
where wc the length of the sliding window.
Note that node i does not discard the validated requests
that are pending in the bucket queues. These are removed
from the pending queue either when it proposes the re-
quest in a PRE-PREPARE message or when the request
is committed, as explained in section 4.2.
4.6 State transfer
Replicas can temporarily become unavailable, either due
to network partitioning, or due to transient failures. Upon
recovery/reconnection, replicas must obtain several pieces
of information before being able to actively participate in
the protocol again. To achieve this, replicas need to obtain
current epoch configuration information, the latest stable
checkpoint (which occurred at the round having sequence
h), as well as information concerning proposals having
sequence numbers between h+1 and the current round n.
The state must, in particular, contain two pieces of in-
formation: (1) the current epoch configuration, which is
necessary to determine the leaders from which the replica
should accept proposals, and (2) client timestamps at the
latest checkpoint, which are necessary to prevent includ-
ing client requests that have already been proposed in fu-
ture blocks.
A reconnecting replica i obtains this information by
broadcasting a 〈HELLO, nei, ci, bi〉 message, where
nei is the latest NEW-EPOCH message received by the
replica, ci is the replica’s last stable checkpoint, and bi
is the last batch i delivered. Upon receipt of a HELLO
message, another replica j replies with its own HELLO
message, as well as with any missing state from the last
stable checkpoint and up to the current round n.
We perform further optimizations in order to reduce the
amount of data that needs to be exchanged in case of a re-
connection. First, upon reconnecting, replicas announce
their presence but wait for the next stable checkpoint after
reconnection before actively participating in the protocol
again. This enables us to avoid transferring the entire state
related to requests following the preceding stable check-
point. Second, the amount of data related to client times-
tamps that needs to be transmitted can be reduced through
only exchanging the root of the Merkle tree containing
the client timestamps, with the precise timestamps being
fetched on a per-need basis.
4.7 Membership reconfiguration
While details of membership reconfiguration are out-
side of the scope of this paper, we briefly describe
how Mir deals with adding/removing clients and nodes.
Such requests, called configuration requests are totally
ordered like other requests, but are tagged to be inter-
pretable/executed by nodes (hence they are not subject
to the LTO optimization, Sec. 5.1). As Mir processes
requests out of order (just like PBFT), configuration re-
quests cannot be executed right after committing a re-
quest as the timing of commitment might diverge across
nodes resulting in non-determinism. Instead, configura-
tion requests are taken into account only at checkpoints
and more specifically all configuration requests ordered
between checkpoints k − 1 and k, take effect only after
checkpoint k + 1.
4.8 Implementation Architecture
We implemented Mir in Go. Our implementation is
multi-threaded and inspired by consensus-oriented par-
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allelism (COP) architecture previously applied to PBFT
to maximize its throughput on multicore machines [16].
Specifically, in our implementation, a separate thread
is dedicated to managing each batch during the com-
mon case operation, which simplifies Mir code structure
and helps maximize performance. We further parallelize
computation-intensive tasks whenever possible (e.g., sig-
nature verifications, hash computations). The only com-
munication in common case between Mir threads pertains
to request duplication prevention – the shared data struc-
tures for duplication prevention are hash tables, with per-
bucket locks; instances that handle requests correspond-
ing to different leaders do not access the same buckets.
The only exception to the multi-threaded operation of Mir
is during an ungracious epoch-change, where a designated
thread (Mir Manager) is responsible for stopping worker
common-case threads and taking the protocol from one
epoch to the next. This manager thread is also respon-
sible for sequential batch delivery and for checkpointing,
which however does not block the common-case threads
managing batches.
Our implementation also parallelizes network access.
We use a configurable number of independent network
connections between each pair of servers, which results
in several gRPC connections between each pair of servers
(the number of gRPC connections between a pair of
servers is, however, considerably smaller than the number
of Mir threads). This proves to be critical in boosting Mir
performance beyond seeming bandwidth limitations in a
WAN that stem from using a single TCP/TLS connection.
In addition to multiple internode connections, we use an
independent connection for handling client requests. As a
result, the receipt of requests is independent of the rest of
the protocol – we can safely continue to receive client re-
quests even if the protocol is undergoing an epoch change.
Our implementation can hence seamlessly use, where pos-
sible, separate NICs for client’s requests and intranode
communication to address DoS attacks [23].
Finally, cleaning-up duplication prevention-related data
structures at checkpoint is a relatively expensive opera-
tion; yet because the watermark distance is larger than the
checkpoint period, BFT instances can still proceed even
when handling a checkpoint — therefore, this does not
significantly affect throughput.
Persisting state (durability). By default, Mir implemen-
tation does not persist state or message logs to stable stor-
age. Hence, a node that crashes might recover in a com-
promised state — however, as described above, such a
node does not participate in the protocol until the next sta-
ble checkpoint which effectively restores the correct state.
While we opted for this approach assuming that for few
dozens of nodes simultaneous faults of up to a third of
them will be rare, for small number of nodes the probabil-
ity of such faults grows and with some probability might
exceed threshold f . Therefore, we optionally persist state
pertaining to sent messages in Mir, which is sufficient for
a node to recover to a correct state after a crash. Section 7
shows the minimal performance impact of persisting state
in Mir.
5 Optimizations
5.1 Lightweight Total Order (LTO)
When the system is network-bound (e.g., on with large
requests and/or on a WAN) the maximum throughput is
driven by the amount of data each leader can broadcast in
a PRE-PREPARE message. However, data, i.e., request
payload, is not critical for total order, as the nodes can es-
tablish total order on digests. While in many blockchains
all nodes need data [2, 4], in some others [13], ordering
is separated from request execution and full replication
across ordering nodes is an overkill.
For such blockchains, Mir optionally boosts through-
put using what we call Light Total Order (LTO) broadcast.
LTO is defined in the same way as TO broadcast (Sec. 2.1)
except that LTO requires property P4 to hold for hash of
the request H(r) instead for request r and adds the fol-
lowing property:
P5 Partial Replication: If a correct client broadcasts
request r, then at least one correct node eventually
delivers r.
LTO optimization for Mir modifies the protocol as fol-
lows. Each leader broadcasts a full PRE-PREPARE
message only to a set of 2f + 13 Replicas (a leader is
always in Replicas of its own batch). To the rest of the
nodes, let us call them Observers, the leader broadcasts
a lightweight PRE-PREPARE message which contains
only metadata about the requests. This metadata contains:
(a) the hash of the request (b) the identifier of the client
who submitted the request and (c) the request timestamp.
The request hash is necessary so that each node can re-
move committed requests from their pending queues. The
client identifier and request timestamp are necessary to
guarantee that all nodes advance the watermarks per client
in consistently.
Upon receiving a PRE-PREPARE (Sec. 4.2),
Observers must only verify: (a) condition (1): the epoch
3It is possible to reduce LTO partial replication to f + 1 nodes, yet
we keep 2f + 1 for better realistic data availability.
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number of the batch is correct and no other batch has
been proposed in the same epoch with the same sequence
number and (b) condition (6) to guarantee no duplication.
Conditions (2)-(5) and (7)-(8) ensure that the batch is
valid and it is sufficient that one correct node has verified
them. Such a correct verifier will always exist among the
set of 2f + 1 senders of the PREPARE messages that
each node expects before sending a COMMIT message.
5.2 Signature Verification Sharding
As the Mir multi-leader approach addresses network bot-
tlenecks, it often exposes a CPU bottleneck due to rela-
tively costly client signature verification. To offload CPU,
we enable the signature verification sharding optimiza-
tion. In short, in a stable epoch we require that the sig-
natures in each batch are verified by only f + 1 nodes
instead of requiring each node to perform a signature veri-
fication, while in a recovery epoch, the number of verifiers
is 2f + 1.
In detail, let V erifiers(sn, e) be the set of nodes that
are responsible for verifying the transaction signatures of
the batch with sequence number sn in epoch e. The leader
that proposes the batch is always in V erifiers(sn, e).
For the other nodes in V erifiers(sn, e) we use a
partitioning mechanism similar to the one we intro-
duced for partitioning requests into buckets. Each batch
is hashed to a value and the value is mapped to a
V erificationBucket. However, unlike with request
sharding, where each bucket is assigned to exactly one
leader, each V erificationBucket is assigned to f + 1
(resp., 2f + 1) nodes in a stable (resp., recovery) epoch.
A node i upon receiving 〈PRE-PREPARE, sn, e〉
verifies the clients’ signatures in a batch if
i ∈ V erifiers(sn, e) before broadcasting
〈PREPARE, sn, e〉. Otherwise, if i /∈ V erifiers(sn, e),
node iwill check only conditions (1)-(7) (see section 4.2).
Each node j broadcasts 〈COMMIT, sn, e〉 upon receiv-
ing 〈PRE-PREPARE, sn, e〉. In a stable epoch, a node
waits for 〈PREPARE, sn, e〉 from all f + 1 nodes in
V erifiers(sn, e) and f more PREPARE messages.
5.3 Lightweight Leader Discovery
We designed the best-effort lightweight discovery mech-
anism to help the client send the request to a single
node, which is actually responsible for the request, while
maintaining low latency (which might grow if the client
“misses” the responsible leader).
Within a recovery epoch e, the discovery of the leader
responsible for h is equivalent to discovering the view
leader in PBFT. Every node participating in epoch e has
the configuration of e, including the bucket assignment
and can point the client to the right node. If a client con-
tacts a correct node, it gets a correct bucket assignment,
which needs to be done by the client only once per epoch.
In the case of a stable epoch e, a node replies to the
client with the current bucket assignment, from which the
client can deduce the next f (or more) nodes that will
be responsible for the client’s request in case the epoch
change does not occur. Then the client submits the re-
quest to the apparent responsible node, and has the pos-
sibility to additionally send the request to one of more of
the next responsible leaders. In the worst case, the client
sends the request to all nodes as described in Section 4.1.
6 Correctness Arguments
In this section we sketch Mir correctness arguments, fo-
cusing on TO properties, as defined in Section 2, dis-
cussing also the impact of optimizations (Sec. 5).
Validity (P1) relies on clients’ signatures which Mir
uses to authenticate the requests. Without signature shard-
ing, every signature is verified by at least 2f + 1 nodes,
out of which f + 1 are correct. With signature sharding,
clients’ signatures are verified by at least f +1 nodes, out
of which at least one is correct — guaranteeing Validity.
Agreement (P2) is best shown by contradiction and re-
duction to PBFT Agreement, which we outline here. Sup-
pose that Agreement does not hold in Mir; in this case, be-
cause of the Mir structure which generalizes PBFT, there
exists an execution of PBFT similar to that of Mir, in
which: 1) all requests proposed in a Mir epoch are pro-
posed in the respective PBFT view by the primary, 2) ev-
ery gracious epoch change in Mir is replaced by view-
change in PBFT due to timeouts, and 3) there is an Agree-
ment violation in PBFT. A contradiction.
No-duplication (P3) stems from the way Mir pre-
vents duplicate pre-prepares (rule (6) in accepting PRE-
PREPARE, Sec/ 4.2). The exception to this rule, in form
of batch/request resurrection during ungracious epoch
change (Sec. 4.4.2), does not impact P3, as only requests
from uncommitted batches as resurrected.
Liveness (P4) can be shown by contradiction as follows.
Assume a correct client sends a request to all nodes, which
is received by at least one correct node i.4 Fix req to be
the oldest request received by i for which liveness is bro-
ken. Consider time after GST . It is easy to show that
in Mir, either (1) i becomes an epoch primary infinitely
often, or (2) there is the last epoch e, a stable epoch that
runs infinitely long. In case (1), let e be an epoch in which
4The argument holds even if the client sends a request to f+1 nodes.
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Batch size 2 MB
Cut batch timeout 250 ms
Epoch-change timeout 20 s
Max batches per epoch ∞ (stable), 16 ∗ n (recovery)
Bucket rotation period 16 ∗ n
Buckets per leader (m) 2
Checkpoint period 16 (n ≤ 16), 64 (n < 16 ≤ 49), 128 (n > 49)
Watermark window size 64 (n ≤ 16), 128 (n < 16 ≤ 49), 256 (n > 49)
Parallel gRPC connections 5 (n = 4), 3 (n = 10), 2 (n > 10)
Table 2: Mir configuration parameters used in evaluation
req is the oldest request pending at node i and i is the pri-
mary (such an epoch exists due to the choice of req and
the resurrection of uncommitted but pre-prepared requests
(Sec. 4.4.2)). In case (2), i gets to be the leader infinitely
often in e including being the leader of a bucket req be-
longs to. In both cases, req gets proposed by i and is
committed (system runs after GST ), a contradiction.
Signature sharding (Sec. 5.2) optimization does not
compromise Validity/Agreement. In case of a stable
epoch, we expect all the nodes to be alive, since all nodes
are in EpLeaders set. Therefore, we expect that all
f + 1 PRE-PREPARE messages from V erifiers will
arrive. If either some node does not forward a PRE-
PARE or a leader is malicious and does not forward
〈PRE-PREPARE, sn, e〉 to V erifiers, sn, e the batch
timer will expire and Mir enters a recovery epoch. In case
of a recovery epoch |V erifiers(sn, e)| = 2f +1. As the
set of 2f + 1 nodes that sent PRE-PREPARE and PRE-
PARE messages intersect with the set of V erifiers in at
least f +1 nodes in a recovery epoch, at least one of these
will be a correct node.
Finally, it is easy to see that LTO optimization (Sec. 5.1)
yields Liveness (P4) on hashes and ensures Partial Repli-
cation (P5, Sec. 5.1) on request payloads.
7 Evaluation
In this section, we report on experiments we conducted
in scope of Mir performance evaluation. Our evaluation
aims at answering the following questions: (1) how does
Mir scale on a WAN? (2) how does Mir perform in clus-
ters? (3) what is the impact of bucket rotation duplication
prevention mechanism on a variant of Mir that is not ro-
bust? (4) what is the impact of Mir optimizations? (5)
how does Mir perform under faults? and (6) what is the
impact of persisting state (durability) in Mir?
7.1 Experimental setup
Our evaluation consists of microbenchmarks of 2 request
payload sizes: (1) small, 500 byte requests, which corre-
spond to average Bitcoin tx size [9], and (2) large, 3500
byte requests, typical in Hyperledger Fabric [13].
We compare Mir to a state-of-the-art PBFT implemen-
tation optimized for multi-cores [16]. For fair compar-
ison, we use the Mir codebase tuned to closely follow
the PBFT implementation of [16] hardened to implement
Aardvark [23]. As another baseline, we compare the com-
mon case performance of Chain, an optimistic subpro-
tocol of the Aliph BFT protocol [15], which is known
to be throughput-optimal in clusters. PBFT and Chain
are always given best possible setups, i.e., PBFT leader
is always placed in a node that has most effective band-
width and Chain spans the path with the smallest latency.
We also compare with Honeybadger [40] using the open
source implementation5 which was also used in the per-
formance evaluation in [40]. We only compare Honeybad-
ger with Mir for small requests, since the default payload
in the open source implementation is fixed to 250 byte re-
quests. We do not compare to other protocols because
they are either unavailable (e.g., Hashgraph [35], Red
Belly [24]), unmaintained (BFT-Mencius [41]), faithfully
approximated by PBFT (e.g., BFT-SMaRt [17], Spinning
[47], Tendermint [7]), or report considerably worse per-
formance than Mir (e.g., Algorand [30]).
We use VMs on a leading cloud provider, with 32 x
2.0 GHz VCPUs and 32GB RAM, equipped with 1Gbps
networking and limited to that value for experiment re-
peatability, due to non-uniform bandwidth overprovision-
ing we sometimes experienced. Mir number of connec-
tions varies and is higher for smaller number of nodes. In
Table 2 we provide all the configuration parameter of Mir
we use in our performance evaluation.
5https://github.com/initc3/HoneyBadgerBFT-
Python
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Figure 4: WAN scalability experiment.
7.2 Scalability on WANs
To evaluate Mir scalability, we ran it with up to n = 100
nodes on a WAN setup which spans 16 distinct data-
centers across the world (beyond n = 16, we collocate
nodes across already used datacenters). Figure 4 depicts
the common-case stable epoch performance of Mir, com-
pared to that of PBFT and Chain (for both small and large
requests) and Honeybadger (for small requests).
Client requests are generated by increasing the client
instances and request rate per client instance until the
throughput is saturated and we report the throughput just
below saturation. Client machines are also uniformly dis-
tributed across the 16 datacenters. The client instances es-
timate which node i has an active bucket for each of their
requests and broadcast each request to nodes i−1, · · · , i+
k, where k ≤ f − 1, so at most to f + 1 nodes.
We observe that PBFT throughput decays rapidly, fol-
lowing an O(1/n) function and scales very poorly. Chain
scales better and even improves with up to n = 16 nodes,
sustaining 20k (resp., 3k) tps for small (resp., large) re-
quests. It is worth emphasizing that: (1) our evaluation
of Chain is best-case and involves the manual assignment
of the best path to Chain, and (2) Chain is not robust and
needs to be abandoned in case of faults [15].
Compared to Honeybadger, Mir retains higher through-
put, even though: (i) Honeybadger request size is smaller
(250 bytes vs 500 bytes), and (ii) Honeybadger batches
are significantly larger (up to 500K requests in our eval-
uation). This is due to the fact that Honeybadger is com-
putationally bound by O(N2) threshold signatures verifi-
cation and on top of that the verification of the signatures
is done sequentially. Honeybadger’s throughput also suf-
fers from request duplication (on average 1/3 duplicate
requests per batch), since the nodes choose the requests
they add in their batches at random. Moreover, we report
on Honeybadger latency, which is in the order of minutes
(partly due to the large number of requests per batch and
partly due to heavy computation), is significantly higher
than that of Mir. In our evaluation we could not increase
the batch size as much as in the evaluation in [40], es-
pecially with increasing the number of nodes beyond 16,
due to memory exhaustion issues. Finally, in our evalua-
tion PBFT outperforms Honeybadger (unlike in [40]), as
our implementation of PBFT leverages the parallelism of
Mir codebase.
In summary, Mir delivers 53.7k (resp., 20.5k) tps with
small (resp., large) requests with n = 4 nodes, which
drops to 42k (resp., 15.1k) tps at n = 49 nodes, a penalty
of 22-27%. With n = 100, these numbers reduce to 23.2k
(resp., 8.3k tps, more than 2.5x improvement over Chain),
a further 45% penalty. We attribute this drop in part to
the heterogeneity of VMs across datacenters (despite the
identical specifications). Nevertheless, Mir delivers the
best performance of all protocols to date with 100 nodes
on a WAN, even compared to very optimistic protocols
such as Chain.
7.3 Performance in clusters
Figure 5 depicts fault-free performance in clusters with
up to n = 22 nodes. For small requests, Chain dominates
Mir delivering roughly 2.2x the peak throughput (130k tps
vs 60k tps). This difference is due to the cryptographic
verification of signatures in Mir (Chain uses vectors of
MACs to authenticate a request to f+1 replicas). Indeed,
as soon as we add clients’ signatures to Chain (ChainSigs
in Fig. 5), Chain’s throughput drops slightly below that
of Mir (small requests) or is roughly equal to it (large
requests). Mir delivers consistently roughly 60k (resp.,
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Figure 5: Throughput performance of Mir compared to
Chain and PBFT in clusters.
23k) tps throughput for small (resp., large) requests, sig-
nificantly outperforming PBFT.
7.4 Impact of bucket rotation and optimiza-
tions
In this experiment (see Fig. 6) we fix n = 16 and run
detailed fault-free latency-throughput experiments on a
WAN for Mir and its variants. We also show the per-
formance of Chain and PBFT as a reference. Nodes are
distributed over 16 distinct datacenters across the world.
Mir robust bucket rotation (Sec. 4.3, “Mir (vanilla)”
in Fig. 6) saturates at roughly 32k (resp., 15k) tps for
small (resp., large) requests, an approximate overhead of
9-17% compared to an idealized non-robust vanilla Mir
(“Mir-NoRotation”) which delivers up to 35k (resp., 18k)
tps. This is more than compensated by Mir optimizations
(Sec. 5). With signature sharding and LTO, Mir restores
the peak throughput to 18k tps for large transactions (de-
livering over 500Mbps goodput). For small transactions,
LTO does not considerably improve performance because
bandwidth is not the bottleneck (hence not shown), but
signature sharding boosts Mir up to 48k tps.
All variants of Mir maintain roughly 1s (low load) to 2s
(high load) end-to-end latency and convincingly outper-
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Figure 6: Impact of bucket rotation and Mir optimizations
on a WAN with n=16 nodes.
form PBFT and Chain. PBFT latency is lower at 600-800
ms, yet PBFT saturates under very low load in Mir terms.
7.5 Performance under faults
We now describe the behavior of Mir when leader crashes
occur. Figure 7 presents the evolution of throughput as a
function of time when one and two leaders fail simultane-
ously. We run this experiment in a WAN setting with 16
nodes, and trigger a view change if an expected batch is
not delivered within 20 seconds. When there is one leader
failure, a view change is triggered and the system imme-
diately transitions to a configuration with 15 leaders, and
a virtually optimal throughput. When two failures occur
simultaneously, the first view changes takes the system to
a configuration with 15 leaders. The first few batches are
delivered in this configuration, but, since one of the 15
leaders has failed, a second view change is triggered that
takes the system to a configuration with 14 leaders, from
which execution can continue. In this scenario, the fig-
ure also depicts the evolution of the leader set in case the
failed nodes return online: within three epochs, the sys-
tem is in a stable state with 16 leaders again.
We can observe that gracious epoch changes are seam-
less in Mir (these occur from second 141 onwards in the
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experiment with 2 faults, and are described in Sec. 4.4.1),
whereas ungracious epoch changes (when throughput
drops to 0 due to actual faults, see Sec. 4.4.2) last in the
order of epoch change timeouts.
7.6 Impact of durability
As durability is particularly relevant to small scale Mir de-
ployments (Sec. 4.8), we evaluate the impact of durability
with 4 nodes, in a LAN setting, using small transactions.
We find that durability has no impact on total through-
put, mainly due to the fact that persisted messages are
amortized due to batching, Mir parallel architecture and
the computation-intensive workload. However, average
request latency increases by roughly 300ms.
8 Related Work
The seminal PBFT [22] protocol (see also Sec. 2.2) started
intensive research on practically feasible BFT protocols.
Performance-wise, PBFT has a single-leader bottleneck
and does not scale with the number of nodes. Mir general-
izes PBFT and removes this bottleneck with a multi-leader
approach enforcing a robust request duplication preven-
tion. Request duplication elimination is simple in PBFT
and other single-leader protocols, which require the leader
to enforce it.
Aardvark [23] was the one the first BFT protocols,
along with [47, 12, 14], to point out the importance of
BFT protocol robustness, i.e., sustainable liveness in pres-
ence of active denial of service and performance attacks.
In practice, Aardvark is a hardened PBFT protocol, and
uses clients’ signatures, regular periodic view-changes
(rotating primary) and resource isolation using separate
NICs for separating client-node from node-node traffic.
Mir implements all of these and is robust in Aardvark
sense. Beyond Aardvark-like features, Mir is the first pro-
tocol that combines robustness with multiple leaders, pre-
venting request duplication performance attacks, paving
the way for Mir’s excellent performance.
The first replication protocol to point out the impor-
tance of multiple leaders was Mencius [39] in the con-
text of crash-failures. Mencius is a Paxos-style [36] proto-
col which leverages multiple leaders to reduce the latency
of replication on WANs, the approach which was later
followed by other crash-tolerant protocols (e.g., EPaxos
[42]). The approach was extended to the BFT context by
BFT-Mencius [41]. Mencius and BFT-Mencius are geared
towards optimizing latency and shard clients’ requests by
mapping a client to a node. However, as a node can cen-
sor the request, a client is forced, in the worst case to re-
transmit the request to other nodes which creates a vulner-
ability to request duplication attacks which BFT-Mencius
does not handle. Mir, instead, maps clients’ requests to
buckets which are then assigned to nodes, not unlike con-
sistent hashing [31]. Mir further rotates bucket assign-
ment in time to enforce robustness to request duplication.
Unlike Mencius, EPaxos and BFT-Mencius, Mir does not
optimize for latency, paying a small price as it does not
assign clients to the closest nodes — however, our exper-
iments show that this impact is acceptable, in particular
given that the blockchain is not the most latency-sensitive
application.
Recent BFT protocols, proposed in the blockchain con-
text [24, 35], that exhibit multi-leader flavor, also do not
address request duplication. Furthermore, unlike Mir,
these proposals invent new BFT protocols from scratch
which is a highly error-prone and tedious process [15].
To date, these proposals remain unproven. In contrast,
Mir follows an evolutionary rather then revolutionary de-
sign approach to a multi-leader protocol, building upon
proven PBFT/Aardvark algorithmic and systems’ con-
structs, which considerably simplifies the reasoning about
Mir correctness.
Optimistic BFT protocols [15, 34] have been showed to
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be very efficient on a small-scale in clusters. In particular
Aliph [15], is a combination of Chain crash-tolerant repli-
cation [46] ported to BFT and backed by PBFT/Aardvark
outside the optimistic case, in which all nodes are cor-
rect. We demonstrated that Mir holds its ground with
BFT Chain in clusters and it considerably outperforms it
in WANs. Nevertheless, Mir remains compatible with the
modular approach to building the optimistic BFT proto-
cols of [15], where Mir can be used as a robust and high-
performance backup protocol. Zyzzyva [34] is an opti-
mistic leader-based protocol that optimizes for latency.
While we opted to implement Mir based on PBFT, Mir
variants based on Zyzzyva latency-efficient communica-
tion pattern are conceivable with our approach.
Eventually synchronous BFT protocols, to which Mir
belongs, circumvent the FLP consensus impossibility re-
sult [28] by assuming eventual synchrony. These proto-
cols, Mir included, guarantee safety despite asynchrony
but rely on eventual synchrony to provide liveness. Al-
ternatively, probabilistic BFT protocols such as Honey-
badger [40] provide both safety and liveness (except with
negligible probability) in purely asynchronous networks.
By comparing Honeybadger and Mir, we showed that this
comes as a tradeoff, as Mir significantly outperforms Hon-
eybadger, even though both protocols target the same de-
ployment setting (up to 100 nodes in a WAN).
Finally, as blockchains brought an arms-race to BFT
protocol scalability [48], many proposals focus on large,
Bitcoin-like scale, with thousands or tens of thousands of
nodes [30, 27]. In particular, Algorand [30] is a recent
BFT protocol that deals with BFT agreement in popula-
tions of thousands of nodes, by relying on a verifiable
random function to select a committee in the order of
hundred(s) of node. Algorand then runs a smaller scale
agreement protocol inside a committee. We foresee Mir
being a candidate for this “in-committee” protocol inside
a system such as Algorand as well as in other blockchains
that effectively restrict voting to a smaller group of nodes,
as is the case in e.g., Proof of Stake proposals [20]. In
addition, Mir is particularly interesting to permissioned
blockchains, such as Hyperledger Fabric [13].
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